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An Examination into the Conduct of the Present Administration, from the year 1774 to 1778...

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An Examination into the CONDUCT of the Present Administration,

From the Year 1774 to the Year 1778.

AN EXAMINATION INTO THE CONDUCT OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION,

From the Year 1774 to the Year 1778.

AND A

PLAN OF ACCOMMODATION WITH AMERICA.

BY A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

LONDON:

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AN EXAMINATION

Into the CONDUCT of the preſent ADMINISTRATION, &c.

THE ſtate of the conteſt with our North American Colonies, and the commencement of hoſtilities with France, muſt afford a melancholy proſpect to every well-wiſher of Great Britain. Our bad ſucceſs, during the progreſs of that conteſt, has, by many people, been aſcribed to the want of public virtue among us, and to that luxury and diſſipation which are ſo univerſally prevalent. But whoever conſiders the vigorous exertions, made by Great Britain, during the laſt war, will hardly ſuppoſe, that in a period of leſs than twenty years, ſhe could have undergone ſo total a change of manners, as to have produced ſuch different fortune in the preſent one. This conſideration, I am afraid, will lead us to impute ſome part, at leaſt, of our preſent misfortunes to the conduct of Miniſtry; the ſtile and character of which appear ſo very

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different from that which was exhibited in the laſt war. In this view of the matter, an enquiry into the conduct of Adminiſtration, at this critical period, together with ſome reflections on the preſent ſtate of affairs, may, it is hoped, require no apology.

It is almoſt needleſs to go farther back in the hiſtory of the American queſtion, than the beginning of the preſent Parliament. The only meaſure of the laſt Parliament, which I ſhall take notice of, is the Boſton Port Bill, and this bill ſeemed ſo proper a retaliation for the offence, that it ſtruck no party, either as very abſurd or very ſevere *. It was a puniſhment too which was at an end whenever the offenders ſhould ceaſe to offend, and make reparation; but it was a puniſhment which could not fail to irritate the New England provinces at leaſt, and therefore ſhould have been followed either by a force ſufficient to have conquered that obſtinacy, or by a total diſſolution of the claim which cauſed the difference between this country and America. Neither of theſe ways being

* There was no debate in Parliament at the commencement of this bill, and not much in the courſe of it. In ſo much that Mr. R——, whoſe memory retains faſt hold of all ſuch Minority ſlips, has not been backward in putting Oppoſition in mind that they forgot their friends at that time.

purſued,

purſued, the event has proved as hurtful to the purſe, as it has been mortifying to the ſpirit of the nation.

At the beginning of this Parliament, a number of papers, containing facts without opinions, were laid before both Houſes, and, after due time given to peruſe them, reſolutions were formed, as the groundwork of our conduct with reſpect to America. Theſe reſolutions, however, were adhered to but for a moment; and while Adminiſtration were holding forth all the terrors of prohibitions to trade, prohibitions to fiſhing, and alteration of charters *, with one hand, they dealt out with the other a ſyſtem of reconciliation, completely nugatory in its end, by giving up the idea of taxation, upon a quibble, and neceſſarily ruinous in its conſequences, by conveying to the Colonies the ſtrangeſt ſymptoms of our fear and irreſolution. The hopes of any good effect from this conciliatory plan were ſoon at an end, and the reception it met with in America, was exactly what any prudent Miniſter ought to have foreſeen. This reception baniſhed

* Never was a meaſure of State worſe timed than the Maſſachuſſet's Charter Bill. It might have been neceſſary when America had ſubmitted, but in the midſt of popular tumult, to enrage, by changing the moſt favoured ſyſtem of Colony government, was ſurely bad policy.

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all our ideas of reconciliation, and it became neceſſary that the rights of this country over America ſhould be decided and maintained by the ſword. How far our conduct in the field has been ſuperior to that in the ſenate, I will leave the event to declare. I pretend not to any knowledge in military affairs, and will not be raſh enough to condemn any General unheard; but I cannot help thinking there is ſufficient reaſon to affirm, that want of vigour and deciſion in our councils, was the FIRST and great cauſe of our misfortunes in America.

Since the firſt dawning of regular liberty in this country, thoſe who took any concern in public affairs have been divided into parties; and it has uniformly been imputed to that party who were out of power, that their oppoſition to government proceeded from their deſire of obtaining the places of thoſe who directed affairs. But whatever may be the juſtice of this imputation, it is to be obſerved, that the party that oppoſed Adminiſtration have generally founded their oppoſition upon popular topics, and have ſecured the voice of the nation upon their ſide: and unleſs when the people have been flattered by the glory of a ſucceſsful war, there are but few examples, in the hiſtory of this country, of unſucceſsful Miniſters and an unpopular

unpopular Oppoſition. Even with this aid they have often been baffled; but without it, they have never been ſucceſsful. In this manner the ruin of Lord Godolphin and the Duke of Marlborough, with the eſtabliſhment of Harley and St. John, was accompliſhed. The ſame aid helped to ruin them in their turn. To this we may aſcribe the fate of Sir Robert Walpole, though, like Samſon, he contrived to pull the edifice about the ears of thoſe who had plotted his ruin; and to this alſo we muſt attribute the appointment of Lord Chatham to that ſituation, which enabled him to acquire ſo much glory to the name of Britain and the name of Pitt. It was reſerved for the preſent Oppoſition to reject the policy of their predeceſſors, and adopt a ſyſtem the reverſe of what has been mentioned. That, in common with the reſt of mankind, it is their ambition to get into power, it were folly to diſpute; that they have erred in the means, it were blindneſs not to ſee. That they may have been conſcientious in their intentions, their neglecting the proper means to enſure ſucceſs may be conſidered as a proof. That the end has been unfortunate, not to ſay worſe of it, the ſituation of this country muſt, for ever teſtify. It has been acknowledged, by the moſt ſanguine minded among them, that

that the defence of American liberty was unpopular *, yet they have uniformly perſevered in declaiming in favour of that liberty; and while the torrent of popular rage was ready, at every moment, to burſt out againſt our Miniſters for their ill conduct, the people could repoſe no confidence in the Minority, whoſe principles they abhorred. Had the importance of the names of Wentworth and Cavendiſh, aided by the abilities of a Fox and a Burke, overlooked the abſtract queſtion of American taxation, and conſidered merely the conduct of the war; had they thought means, perhaps not perfectly conſiſtent with their opinion, juſtifiably uſed in removing men, whoſe conduct they deemed hurtful to the conſtitution; they might, before this time, have given a final blow to the power of an irreſolute and unſucceſsful Adminiſtration.

At the beginning of the fourth ſeſſion of this Parliament, the news of the defeat and ſurrender of Burgoyne's army arrived. The diſmay that was painted on every countenance on the news of this event, is hardly to be deſcribed. It was, perhaps, not unnatural, but it exhibited an ill omen of our national ſpirit. Britain has ſeen the

* Mr. Fox has again and again allowed that the American queſtion was unpopular.

day

day when her expreſſions of grief would have been otherwiſe. She would have felt for the brave and generous men that ſuffered the diſgrace of a ſurrender in her cauſe; but ſhe would have ſtrove, with a ſtern and undaunted countenance, to have avenged herſelf upon the enemy. Nor was the diſmay upon this occaſion confined to the multitude, who, unaccuſtomed to reſources and expedients, are eaſily elated, and eaſily depreſſed. On the evening when that intelligence was made public in the Houſe of Commons, his Majeſty's Miniſters betrayed as much dejection as the moſt inexperienced and ignorant member of that Houſe. He muſt be hard hearted and unfeeling indeed, who will deny that this diſaſter was a fit ſubject of concern. But he muſt be equally unſkilled in the ſymptoms of vigour in a ſtate, who will aſſert, that the loſs of three thouſand men was matter of diſmay and dejection to the firſt Miniſters of Great Britain, who ought to be acquainted with the reſources of the country they govern. The cauſe of this inexcuſeable exceſs of terror and apprehenſion muſt lie either in their ignorance of the reſources of this country, or in their own characters.

Their ignorance of the reſources of Great Britain on this occaſion, may be fairly preſumed, when we conſider the want of information

formation which they have betrayed during the whole courſe of the American conteſt. To go no further back in the hiſtory of the preſent Adminiſtration than the firſt diſturbances at Boſton, and the ſubſequent opinions upon thoſe diſturbances. Did the Miniſtry form an idea to themſelves, that that riot was a ſymptom of diſſatisfaction in the minds of the people, that was to be conquered only by a reſolute and early application of force? Did they know that the people of New England had been for a ſeries of years providing themſelves with arms and ammunition? Did they not, on the contrary, flatter themſelves, either through ignorance or indolence, or both, that a mere penal Bill *, unſupported by vigorous conduct, was to allay all the heat and rancour of thoſe exaſperated republicans? Did they not admit of the Britiſh troops under General Gage encamping on Boſton Common? A low ſituation, commanded by all the adjacent grounds, while they ſhould have encamped on the heights of Dorcheſter, commanding all the adjacent country †. Did they not give it as a rea-

* Vide Boſton Port Bill.

† I ſhould not have thought this imputable to Adminiſtration, if I did not now find that the Cabinet in London iſſued orders to their General for their particular conduct. Vide General Clinton's letter to Lord G. G. July 5, 1778.

ſon

ſon for going to New-York, that we ſhould find a great and powerful party in our favour? To what corner of the world did that party fly when we got there? Did they not aſſure us that General Burgoyne was to find the ſame friendly conduct in paſſing down Hudſon's River? Did he find any perſon that bore the aſpect of a friend? Have we not been told of the friendſhip of the province of Quebec? And does not every one know upon what a precarious tenure that province has been, and is now held? A long liſt could ſtill be added, to ſhew their want of proper information reſpecting America; but the event ſufficiently proves it, without a farther enumeration of particulars. Their knowledge of European events has been equally remarkable. The French treaty was begun, concluded, and ſent to America, and for ought we know, the firſt knowledge our Miniſters had of it was when it was notified to Lord Weymouth by the French Ambaſſador *.

The meaſures taken by Adminiſtration upon the ſurrender of General Burgoyne's army, were as ill adapted to call forth the reſources of the country, as the diſmay

* Lord North denied poſitively his knowledge of any ſuch thing, when taxed with it by Mr. Fox the night of the debate upon the Conciliatory Bills.

 which

which they exhibited on that occaſion betrayed miſ-information and weakneſs. Since the beginning of this year, there have been added to the eſtabliſhment twelve new regiments; two in England, one in Wales, and nine in Scotland; in all 12,000 men; whereof 3500 may have been raiſed in England and Wales, 7500 in Scotland, and ſuppoſe the other 1000 in Ireland, ſmuggled over. The effect of this policy has been, to raiſe levy money to an exorbitant ſum, to ruin the recruiting of the old regiments, and damp the ſpirit of officers, by their ſeeing many who have never ſerved put over their heads.

It were to be wiſhed, that ſome method had been taken leſs hurtful to the ſervice, and better calculated to anſwer the purpoſe in point of expedition. What ſuggeſts itſelf on this occaſion is, that each pariſh ſhould furniſh a certain quota. Had an Act paſſed laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, upon the news of General Burgoyne's ſurrender, which was in December, to oblige each pariſh in the kingdom to ſend, at a medium, two able-bodied ſound men, we might have had * two and twenty thouſand

* There are 11,000 pariſhes in Great Britain; 10,000 in England, and 1000 in Scotland: it might perhaps be thought too much for England to ſpare 20,000 from induſtry; therefore let 1½ go from England, and 3½ from Scotland.

men

men to ingraft upon the old corps, (and thus become much ſooner ſoldiers) in leſs time than the neceſſary warrants for the new levies could have paſſed through the War-Office. For what reaſon ſome ſuch ſyſtem as this was neglected, I cannot pretend to determine. That the Bill would have ſuffered oppoſition in paſſing through the Houſes of Parliament, we may conjecture from the diſpoſition of the Minority with reſpect to America. But did the new levies and * *Benevolences* paſs unnoticed. No ſuperiority in point of argument, it is true, could be greater than what the Miniſtry enjoyed on the laſt of theſe queſtions. Yet it would not have been more remarkable than they might have had on the Bill alluded to. There is no pariſh in the kingdom that will think it a hardſhip to give up two or three men fit enough to be ſoldiers, who are but indifferent members of ſociety in their civil capacity. And there is, perhaps, more real humanity in this method, than in the trick and tyranny that has accompanied the new le-

* In a very learned and able debate in the Houſe of Commons, uſhered in by Mr. Dunning, it was attempted to be proved, that the voluntary ſubſcriptions for raiſing men were of the nature of Benevolences. But the ſuperiority of ſound and plain argument upon the part of the Crown lawyers, in oppoſition to ſtrained ingenuity, clearly ſhewed the futility of this ſuppoſition.

 vies

vies. The firſt in the capitals, the ſecond in the diſtant provinces.

The conſternation of our Miniſters, upon the fate of Burgoyne's army, was at laſt productive of the moſt puſillanimous and ruinous meaſure that ever diſgraced the annals of any nation. The meaſure I allude to, it muſt be eaſily perceived, was that of the bills brought into Parliament, relinquiſhing, implicitly and in direct terms, the power of taxation, appointing Commiſſioners to treat with Congreſs, and repealing all thoſe acts of coercion and reſtraint, that it had been the buſineſs of the two firſt ſeſſions of this Parliament to enact. That no offer of conceſſion ſhould have come from this country at any time, and in any circumſtance, has been the opinion of many. That leſs might have been exacted than what we originally demanded from America, had ſhe propoſed an accommodation with us, appears highly reaſonable. But if ever an offer was to be made by this country to America, that it ſhould not have been made in the hour of diſaſter, cannot, I think, be diſputed. The proper occaſion for any ſuch offer would have been when ſome ſignal ſucceſs juſtified our mercy, not when a ſignal misfortune operated upon our fears. All theſe views, however, were diſregarded, and after

after an expence of blood and treaſure, that muſt, for ever, bear heavy on this country; the whole object of the war was to be yielded up at the ſingle moment when it muſt appear the effect of force and terror. And the men who were to * *have America at their feet*, who were to accept of nothing leſs than † *unconditional ſubmiſſion*, were the men who had the confidence to propoſe this ſyſtem of abſolute conceſſion.

It is an unpleaſant taſk to diſcover additional misfortunes to thoſe who are already unfortunate, but it muſt be the taſk of any perſon who pretends to examine into the preſent ſtate of public affairs. That the loſs of America is ſufficient to fill up the meaſure of misfortune to this country, every one will readily allow. That an encroachment, however, upon the moſt ſacred and moſt neceſſary rules of the Conſtitution, is yet a worſe evil than the loſs of the trade and territory of America, will hardly be doubted. As far as freedom is preferable to riches and extent of territory, ſo far is the loſs of America an evil inferior to the ruin of the Conſtitution.

It is univerſally underſtood, that it is the buſineſs of the Miniſter to conduct the

* Lord North's expreſſion.
† Lord George Germaine's.

executive

executive part of Government, without the intervention of Parliament. Nothing can be more wiſe, becauſe nothing can be attended with greater ſafety than this rule. The Miniſter is anſwerable for his conduct to the nation; the dread of a parliamentary impeachment keeps him in awe, and it is therefore the buſineſs of Parliament not to ſcreen him from puniſhment, by a previous approbation of his meaſures.

When a meaſure is laid before Parliament by the Miniſter, their opinions, concerning the expediency of it, muſt, in a great meaſure, be formed according to his repreſentation of the matter; becauſe it cannot be ſuppoſed, that the members have received ſufficient information from any other quarter. The approbation of Parliament, therefore, (even without any ſuppoſition of undue influence) may be generally expected as a thing of courſe; and while it removes from the Miniſter all apprehenſion of a future enquiry, it can afford, to the nation, no ſecurity with reſpect to the propriety of the meaſures approved of.

During the American conteſt, however, the Miniſter has had addreſs enough to make every meaſure of ordinary execution, a meaſure of legiſlation. If we had had a war with France, or any foreign nation, would

would an application have been made to Parliament to ſanctify every ſtep that may have been expedient, and while we protected the Miniſter in his conduct, ruined the cauſe by delay. No body ever thought it neceſſary that perſons ſhould be appointed by Parliament to treat concerning a peace with a foreign power; yet the commiſſion to Lord Howe and his brother received a parliamentary ſanction. They might, with the ſame propriety, have brought a bill into Parliament to appoint our Generals and Admirals.

This conduct I look upon as highly dangerous, and as deviating from one of thoſe rules of government moſt eſſential to the Conſtitution. It is true that there is no law to prevent the Miniſter from coming to Parliament in this manner, as there is a law to prevent troops being raiſed in the time of peace, without the conſent of Parliament; but it is the more neceſſary, on that account, for Parliament, to reject all ſuch applications.

Beſides the greater caution is neceſſary in guarding againſt this abuſe, becauſe it is introduced upon plauſible pretences. For while the Miniſter is counteracting the uſual forms of Government, he is flattering the power to which he applies. It looks like a deference upon the part of the executive

power

power to the judgment of the legiſlative, which muſt be agreeable to the latter. In the preſent caſe, the flattery has gone ſtill farther; it has been ſaid. that the diſpute with America was peculiarly the cauſe of Parliament. The Americans had not called in queſtion the authority of the Crown, but had refuſed to ſubmit to the legiſlative authority. It became, therefore, both decent and requiſite, that Parliament ſhould be conſulted in every ſtep, both legiſlative and executive. But I hope Parliament, upon future occaſions, will ſee the matter in a different light, and will give no concurrence to a mode of procedure ſo dangerous to the Conſtitution; as the dread of parliamentary enquiry is the only effectual circumſtance to ſecure a proper and prudent exertion of the executive power.

Another circumſtance reſpecting the conduct of the preſent Miniſtry ſeems worthy of particular attention. From the earlieſt periods of our hiſtory, the Miniſter has uniformly been looked upon as accountable for the whole executive part of government. Since the enjoyment of a certain and well regulated liberty, when a ſyſtem of public meaſures has been to be changed, the prelude has always been a change of Miniſters. It has been regarded as improper for the ſame men to undo what they themſelves

themſelves have been doing, and as contrary to the intereſt of the country, for thoſe men to remain in power, who have been, in their own acknowledgement, acting to the hurt of the community. When peace was to be made, at the beginning of this century, the power of Marlborough and Godolphin gave way to that of Oxford and Bolingbroke. When war was to be conducted with vigour, the timid and peaceful conduct of Walpole, was forced to give way to the warlike diſpoſition of his enemies. Nor was Lord Chatham, though he conducted the war with glory, thought a fit perſon to make peace. During the early diſputes reſpecting America, they were not the ſame men who enacted and repealed the Stamp Act *. It was reſerved for the preſent Miniſters to ſhew a new example of effrontry to the world, to change in a moment their favourite ſyſtem, without a ſingle change in the councils of his Majeſty, and to remain in the plenitude of power, while they adopted the very language of Oppoſition. When blunder had reduced them to deſpair of carrying their

* I do not mean to ſay, that no ſtate intrigue and private machination had any place in theſe changes, nor that a Miniſter who has conducted a war is unfit to reſtore peace, all I want to prove, my propoſition is, that till aided by change of public meaſures, thoſe machinations have been ineffectual.

ſyſtem into execution, they ſhewed, that rather than quit the contemptible emoluments of office, they would give the lie to all their former conduct. That nothing but the emoluments of office, could have induced them to have changed their opinion and kept their places, all who ſaw and heard them, on the day their new propoſitions were uſhered into the Houſe of Commons, as well as on all future days of the debate on that ſubject, can teſtify. To thoſe who did not ſee or hear them, ſome explanation may be neceſſary. The Premier began with an aukward explaining away of former aſſertions, and finiſhed with a total recantation of former principles. The unſeemly appearance which he exhibited, while he afforded ſuch matter of ſhame to his adherents, and triumph to the oppoſite party, may be eaſily conceived. For four years together had that noble Lord been talking high of Britiſh dignity, and the neceſſity of American dependence, upon a very ſhort warning, moved by a diſaſter that might have been eaſily repaired *, with only the bare ſuſpicion of a French treaty being concluded †; did he undertake to propoſe to the moſt crowded audience, a renunciation of all his former prin-

* Burgoyne's ſurrender.

† I always take his own declarations in the Houſe of Commons.

ciples,

ciples, condemning either his opinions, as ill-founded, impolitic, and impracticable, or his conduct as the worſt deſigned, the worſt directed, and the moſt inadequate to his end. Upon that night, no perſon of his party had courage enough to ſecond his propoſitions, or virtue enough to oppoſe them. Upon a future occaſion, the ſame aukward appearance was made by ſome of his coadjutors, while others were contented to retain their emoluments, without expoſing their change of ſentiments. The noble Lord, who preſided over the American department, was particularly obſerved to ſit ſilent for many days, nor was he prevailed upon till goaded by Oppoſition and invited by Adminiſtration to make a ſimilar recantation of all his former opinions, which perhaps was more aukward in him, becauſe his opinions had been more violent than thoſe of the Miniſter.

By this wavering conduct our national dignity muſt have been impaired in the eyes of all the world. If Great Britain, when ſhe totally changed her public meaſures, had alſo changed her Miniſters, ſhe would no longer have appeared reſponſible for the opinions or ſyſtems of men whom ſhe had diſcarded from her ſervice. By coming under the direction of a new Miniſtry, ſhe might have been ſuppoſed ſenſible of

 the

the blunders of the former, and might have afforded the proſpect of being actuated by a new ſpirit. But by retaining her old directors, at the ſame time that ſhe entirely changed her ſyſtem of actions, ſhe was made to adopt all their inconſiſtencies: ſhe was in ſome meaſure involved in their diſgraces; and ſhe gave her enemies reaſon to expect, that for the future ſhe would diſcover the ſame feebleneſs, and fluctuation of meaſures, by which her paſt conduct had been diſtinguiſhed.

With reſpect to the meaſure of conceſſion propoſed on this occaſion, if it ought ever to have been adopted, it was not at this time, for the reaſons I have given above. But it was not at this time for another reaſon; becauſe, without victory on our ſide, it was in vain to expect that America would agree to our terms. Elated with the hopes of a free and indpendent Empire, and having baffled all our attempts for four campaigns, by the ſingle ſyſtem of avoiding an action; having formed a Government which anſwered all the purpoſes of a ſtate of warfare, in which they were placed; finding reſources beyond their expectations, and in the daily hope of ſupport from a great power, hoſtile in every feeling to Great Britain; was it to be expected, that they who had raiſed objects

objects of ambition to themſelves, which they looked forward to with all the fervour of an imagination heated by political ſchemes, would admit of thoſe hopes being at once blaſted, and their independence annihilated in a moment? Every thinking man might have ſeen that it would be the buſineſs of Congreſs to prevent thoſe who might incline to it, from daring to make an offer of accommodation. And every informed man might have known, that in that country, the whole power is in the hands of the Congreſs. The favourite ſyſtem of dividing America was therefore vain; and that timid and pitiful policy which has governed Adminiſtration during the whole of this queſtion, was now to be baffled a third time *. That the event has been preciſely anſwerable to this conduct, the world is now ſufficiently appriſed. So that Great Britain, after having become an humble ſuppliant at the feet of her Colonies, and after having debaſed herſelf beyond all example or precedent; after having ſeen her Conſtitution violated in moſt eſſential articles, her blood and treaſure laviſhed with the utmoſt prodigality, is now farther from the point ſhe aimed, than ſhe has been during any period of the war.

During the early periods of the Adminiſtration

* The firſt attempt by the Conciliatory Bill; the ſecond by apppointing the Howes Commiſſioners.

ſtration of our preſent Premier, a ſucceſsful attempt to get the better of popular commotion, gave the nation a high opinion of his abilities. At that time the whole world was at peace, and Great Britain, after a vigorous and ſucceſsful war, which had raiſed the glory of her name to unrivalled greatneſs, had, by extending commerce abroad, and improving the arts at home, encreaſed that greatneſs to a degree hitherto unknown and unequalled in any age or country. The conſtitutional queſtions, which had for ſome time been agitated, were now forgotten, and the commotions which had ariſen upon that account, had entirely ſubſided. The people of England, cheriſhed in the lap of proſperity, ſatisfied with the eaſe and tranquility in which they lived, and unalarmed about any encroachments upon the Conſtitution, ſaw nothing to apprehend but the age of the Earl of Guildford, which preſented a proſpect of calling from his proper ſituation, the Miniſter, whoſe rank, integrity, and abilities, rendered him the fitteſt perſon to adviſe his Sovereign, and direct the nation. With all theſe ſplendid and proſperous circumſtances around, a ſtorm began to gather in the weſtern hemiſphere, which threatened to diſturb the ſerenity of the Britiſh ſky. The cauſes of that gloom, and the conſequences neceſſarily ariſing from it, ſeemed to call for the attention, and ought

ought to have prompted the exertion of this illuſtrious Stateſman. How well that perſon, and thoſe whom he had before, and has ſince added, as co-adjutors in office, have acquitted themſelves of that taſk, the dark, the diſtreſſed ſituation of this country can beſt demonſtrate.

In the year 1774, we were in poſſeſſion of the whole Continent of America. The firſt blood that was ſpilt at Lexington began this fatal hiſtory. With what luſtre the conduct of a Britiſh General ſhone forth in that affair, the Gazette can tell. The remainder of that ſummer was waſted within the walls of Boſton, with the ſingle exception of the action at Bunker's Hill; with it the extent of our territory was enlarged, and we were allowed to come as far as that neck of land, over which the rebels ſhould not have been allowed to repaſs, if our ſhips had been managed with common prudence. In the ſpring of 1776, after having ſpent a miſerable winter in Boſton, our troops were obliged to put to ſea, and ſailed for the port of Halifax. The ſummer of this year commenced with ſailing for New-York. Upon our arrival in that bay, Staten Iſland was the only poſt we could occupy, the campaign, however, began and ended with glory to us, and diſgrace to our adverſaries. The taking of Long Iſland and New-York Iſland, followed

ed each other as fast as we could march to take poſſeſſion of them; from thence we drove the rebels from the ſtrong and advantageous poſts of King's Bridge to the Jerſies, and from thence acroſs the Delaware, with ſuch rapidity, that it was nicknamed, by the army, The Jerſey Hunt. They little thought, that with the intervention only of another campaign, they were to be hunted acroſs the ſame country in their turn, by the men they had ſo much diſpiſed. The beginning of the campaign, 1777, was diſtinguiſhed by the march of General Howe to take a view of General Waſhington at Bound Brooke, who, after looking at his right, then at his left, and then at his center, ſaw no poſſibility of attacking him; quitting that ſituation, and covering Lord Cornwallis, who would otherwiſe have found it difficult to retire, the whole army embarked, and all his Majeſty's Miniſters, from the Firſt Lord to the loweſt runner of the Treaſury, declared themſelves equally ignorant of their deſtination *. After many weeks of

* It is obſervable that their ignorance was entirely feigned, for a letter from Sir William Howe to Lord George Germain, dated, New-York, 2d April, 1777, and received 8th May, incloſing one from Sir William Howe to General Carleton, ſays, "As I ſhall probably be in Pennſylvania, when that corps is ready to advance into this province, it will not be in my power to communicate with teh officer commanding it, ſo ſoon as I could wiſh." It is not the buſineſs of

of ſuſpence, we heard of their landing in Cheeſapeak Bay. With the ſame ſuperiority of military diſcipline that diſplayed itſelf in the campaign of 1776, they made themſelves maſters of Philadelphia and the adjacent country; and had they had a few hours more day-light at Brandywine *, the whole rebel army muſt have ſurrendered to them. After keeping poſſeſſion of Philadelphia a whole winter, the policy of our Miniſters, perhaps very wiſely †, required, that they ſhould quit that ſtation and go to New-York. That the General diſplayed great abilities, the troops great bravery, and great fortitude, every one muſt allow; yet, after all, it deſerves the name of a retreat, nay the enemy have come off ſo as to conſtrue the action they had with our troops into a victory, and the Congreſs

of theſe thoughts to diſcuſs the points of, whether Howe ſhould have waited for General Burgoyne, and co-operated with him. If I am to give an opinion, it is, that wiſdom ſhould have directed his ſtay; but it is no apology for the Miniſter's perſiſting in a ſhabby falſehood for months, the apology that Miniſters ſhould not dictate to a Commander in Chief, is at an end, they have dictated to General Clinton.

* See the Gazette account.

† It ſurely was a fortunate, perhaps a wiſe order, that made our army quit Philadelphia at the time they did; had they remained a ſhort time longer, they muſt inevitably have fallen a prey to D'Eſtaign. Yet I can never attribute any degree of merit to the Miniſtry for taking ſo obvious a ſtep; it was the only one that remained, after having allowed of a poſſibility of D'Eſtaign's viſiting that coaſt.

have publickly thanked General Washington on the occasion. Is there a man that would believe that the troops that spread themselves over the Jerſies, from Elizabeth-town to Trenton, in 1776, were to be obliged to march acroſs that country, in the manner of a retreat, and with difficulty ſave their baggage, in the year 1778, for ought Miniſtry knew to run the riſque of being cooped up in New-York in the ſame manner they were in Boſton, without a poſſibility of acting deciſively, or perhaps, what might be more prudent, of quitting the country with ſecurity. If ſuch has been the fate of a war, waged againſt a people who are not yet formed into a nation, whoſe arts of government were yet to learn, and whoſe reſources were unknown and uncertain. What are we to hope from the ſame men waging a war againſt a great and powerful Empire, old in every art of government, acquainted with every mode of reſource, ſkilled in every means of attack and principle of defence.

But the abettors of miniſterial management will ſay, the queſtion with America was very different from the queſtion with France; the delicacy and novelty of the former caſe made it neceſſary to be extremely cautious, leſt we ſhould irritate thoſe into revolt whom we only meant to chaſtiſe for diſobedience.

diſobedience. Without entering into the merit or demerit of this ſort of policy (which I have already in ſome meaſure diſcuſſed) or endeavouring to ſhew, what muſt immediately occur to every one; that if that was the proper ſyſtem at the beginnig, it could not continue ſo in every ſucceſſive campaign in America. I ſhall, after having examined the conduct with reſpect to America for four ſucceſſive years, beg leave to touch upon the conduct with reſpect to France in hardly a greater number of months. Without entering into the inexcuſable ignorance of the French treaty, I ſhall proceed to what more properly relates to their conduct reſpecting the war. It appears from the papers laid before the Houſe of Commons, that the moſt perfect information was given to Miniſtry relative to the fitting out and ſailing of the Toulon ſquadron. Such information as might have warranted them to take ſteps that might have effectually prevented that ſquadron from croſſing the Streights of Gibraltar, and perhaps have cruſhed the American treaty in its earlieſt bud. Yet, inſtead of taking this obvious method of checking in the beginning all attempts of the French to ſuccour America, they choſe to let that fleet ſail, upon the idea that they might puniſh him in the Atlantic, whom they did not chooſe to ſtop

in the Mediterranean; and inſtead of preventing the miſchief he was to do, to call him to account for the miſchief he ſhould have done. That this is unlike the practice of all former Miniſters, few people will venture to deny. When an enemy was certainly to be met with in a calm and placid ſea, where any addition to his ſtrength could eaſily be prevented, where there was no riſk in the voyage, and no difficulty in ſupplying a fleet with every requiſite for that voyage; it was ſurely obvious, that our fleet ſhould have been ſent to the Mediterranean, to check Monſieur D'Eſtaign in the beginning. Not to the Atlantic, where there was an uncertainty of finding him; a probability, or rather a certainty, of his being joined by additional numbers, where the ocean was boiſterous, and the neceſſaries for the voyage very conſiderable: and where the preſence of our fleet could not be inſured, till every thing for our deſtruction, and the advantage of our enemies, might have been compleated.

But I ſhall be told upon this occaſion, has not D'Eſtaign been baffled in all his attempts to ſuccour America, and is not our fleet and army ſtill exiſting in ſafety on that coaſt? It is upon this ſtate of the queſtion I wiſh to argue at preſent.

How does the fact ſtand upon the laſt account from America? Lord Howe ſails for

for the protection of Rhode-Iſland, whither D'Eſtaign had gone to favour an attack of the rebels upon that quarter. What enſues? D'Eſtaign quits the harbour of Rhode-Iſland on the appearance of the Engliſh fleet; Lord Howe finding that the French fleet is too ſtrong for him to attack, without having the weather gage of them, very wiſely attempts to gain it. During this attempt a ſtorm ariſes: both fleets are diſperſed: and after having given an opportunity of proving what all the world allows, and what encreaſes a thouſand fold the guilt of our Miniſters, that Britiſh ſeamen are the moſt brave and intrepid characters in the world: Mr. D'Eſtaign retires to Boſton, out of the poſſibility of being hurt by the additional force that has ſince arrived at New-York. What is the ſtate of the fact reſpecting the fleet under the command of Admiral Byron? After having been diſperſed by a ſtorm, we find one ſhip arriving after another, from the 28th of July to the 15th of September, and a ſufficient number not arriving ſoon enough to admit of their being of any uſe to Lord Howe againſt the French ſquadron. Have we any reaſon, upon this ſtate of facts, to exult in the wiſdom of our Miniſter? Or have they any cauſe to boaſt of the judgment with which they acted to

prevent

prevent the miſchief D'Eſtaign might have done? We are indebted to the elements for our ſafety, but to the Miniſters we are indebted for nothing.

The Toulon ſquadron is the only inſtance that has yet occurred in the French war, that can give us a proper ground for judging of the conduct of our Miniſters. When I ſay this, I do not mean to paſs over the action off Breſt. But the world is yet too much in the dark to judge of the real merit of that action. All, therefore, that I ſhall ſay is this, that though it does not poſitively demonſtrate the bad conduct, it is a proof of the bad fortune of the Miniſters *. The chances upon the cards are pretty equal in favour of every body; and thoſe who do not take advantage of a good hand, muſt expect to be ruined when they meet with a bad one. The world, therefore, will always conclude, that a perſon who is in a conſtant train of loſing, muſt be either an unſkilful or an imprudent player. If our Miniſters then have been going on in

* There is one circumſtance of which Miniſters may perhaps avail themſelves: the number of captures of the enemy's trade, and the ſmall loſſes we have ſuffered. But why they ſhall be allowed to rob individuals of their fame I cannot ſee. They, ſurely, have ſhewn wonderful exertions in this country: a ſtrong proof of what the country can yet do. But their ſucceſs reverberates with more force upon Adminiſtration, and ſhews what opportunities they have miſſed, and what vigour they have left unemployed.

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a courſe of weakneſs, ignorance, and error, to the ruin of their country; if they have bereft it of its dignity, and thrown away its intereſt; if every meaſure of conciliation has been too late, and every method of coercion has been ill planned and ill conducted; and if a removal has become highly expedient, there may ſtill be room for aſking this queſtion. If there are men untried, men who have not had an opportunity of proving their miſconduct, by the ruin of their country, why ſhould we not call them forth? We ſhall certainly have a better proſpect under the conduct of men, who, being unknown, have a character to gain, than of men, who, being thoroughly tried, have none to loſe.

At the period when this country began to ſtruggle for the freedom ſhe has ſince attained, thoſe modes of government and ſyſtems of influence which have ſince taken place, were little known. During the whole reigns of the Houſe of Tudor, the Prince filled the offices of ſtate according to his fancy, without any regard to the influence or abilities of thoſe on whom he beſtowed them. After the acceſſion of the Stewart family, Parliament acquired more weight in the Conſtitution, and the Crown found it neceſſary to employ ſuch Miniſters as

were

were moſt likely to have influence in either Houſe. Since that time this policy of the Crown has been uniformly purſued, and no inſtances have occurred of a Miniſter's being continued in power, in oppoſition to the inclination of Parliament, and to the voice of the nation. I will take the liberty of adding, that this rule is indiſpenſibly neceſſary to our Conſtitution; and that whenever it ſhall be tranſgreſſed for any length of time, our free government is at an end. Every body knows the influence which is poſſeſſed by the Miniſter, in the ordinary tranſactions of Parliament, and perhaps that influence is neceſſary in order to carry on the buſineſs of Government. The only check, however, againſt the abuſes of this ordinary influence, ariſes from the power of Parliament to procure a change of Adminiſtration. Whenever that aſſembly becomes incapable of exerciſing that privilege, the influence of the Miniſter, inſtead of being confined to ordinary tranſactions, will be extended to all ſort of meaſures whatever; and the legiſlative body will, in every caſe, be brought under the entire direction of the executive.

In the preſent circumſtances of Great Britain, after the ſeries of miſmanagements that has happened, when the eyes of the whole world have been opened with reſpect to the conduct of our Miniſter; if, after having

having involved the country in ſo much diſtreſs, by one ſyſtem of operations, he ſhall draw upon himſelf the indignation and contempt of the whole people, and in oppoſition to the voice of the nation ſhall ſtill be continued in office, and if Parliament ſhall not make effectual effort, in order to diſplace him, the concluſion is evident. It deſerves the attention of every Engliſhman.

Permit me juſt to hint at another point, which would take too much time to diſcuſs entirely; that in every free government, there is danger in the exerciſe of the executive power remaining too long in the hands of the ſame Miniſter; becauſe the longer he remains in office, and has had an opportunity of encreaſing his connections, by Miniſterial favour, his influence becomes ſo much the greater, and the difficulty of diſplacing, when he comes to deſerve it, is proportionably augmented.

Upon the preſent occaſion, therefore, all thoſe who have any influence, or any vote in the government of their country, ought to ſurmount every obſtacle that ſtands in the way of its ſafety. They ought to reflect, that the preſent criſis calls aloud for their aſſiſtance: that upon this occaſion every motive of private delicacy and private

attachment ought to give way to public duty. And that they are bound to exert that virtue, that fortitude, that perſeverance, to ſupport that their anceſtors exerted to rear the fabric. Let them conſole themſelves with this reflection, that if they act with the virtue and firmneſs of Engliſhmen, there is yet enough of ſtrength left in this country to reſcue us from the preſent emergency, and perhaps to re-eſtabliſh us in that power and dignity which has, in better days, rendered the name of Britain revered throughout the world.

It may be aſked, at this period of the ſubject, and in this ſituation of affairs, What ſhould be done now? We have tried, without effect, to reduce America by force, and our endeavours to reconcile her by conceſſion, have been equally ineffectual. Are we to enter into a new war with America? Are we to declare them Independent? one of their alternatives; or, are we to withdraw our troops? which is their other alternative. If there exiſted in this country a ſingle man, whoſe pre-eminence in experience, wiſdom, and firmneſs, pointed him out to the general ſenſe of mankind, as a fit perſon to take the guidance of affairs into his hands, whoſe former conduct had ſhewn the vigour of his mind in every action, and whoſe enterprizes had been univerſally fortunate

tunate, who had heaped glory upon his nation, by the ſuperiority with which he conducted her affairs; who diſplayed in himſelf that peculiarity of character that baffled misfortune, becauſe he rejoiced in difficulties; whoſe perſonal character and brilliant eloquence made every ſubordinate intruder tremble at his nod, and whoſe avowed ſyſtem it was to make every inferior department ſubſervient to the buſineſs of the nation, without daring to give advice; who was, in ſhort, ſingularly fitted to make a Miniſter for a war. I ſhould have thought it incumbent on this nation to call that man forth into their ſervice. But LORD CHATHAM is no more, and I am afraid the preſent age does not furniſh out a man capable of carrying any idea of his laſt ſpeech into execution. That great man did, in the beginning, tend to raiſe the combuſtion, that has now well nigh conſumed this nation; but, perhaps, he was, for that among other reaſons, beſt calculated to extinguiſh the flame. What his plan would have been, for carrying on the war, the world has never had unfolded to them; what ought to have been done, it may eaſily be conceived. It ought to have been conducted with ſuch vigour as to have made the enemy feel the miſeries of war and deſolation. Inſtead of permitting what every body allows

it to be, the finest and most high spirited army that ever was led into a field, to languish in quarters. They should have employed it in such a manner as would have forced General Washington to come to an action upon equal terms. In that case, what the event would have been, the few battles we have had in America, upon disadvantageous ground, clearly proves.

But ought we at this period to pursue that method of severity, when France has declared herself the Protector of American rights, and is ready to occupy so great a portion of our national strength and national credit, and when the last of these two articles is so very low? I confess that, zealous as I am for maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain over America, I look upon this at present as impracticable. Would you then declare the Americans independent, in hopes of securing their weight in the scale against France? Having already stooped so low, it may be supposed standing on foolish punctilio not to go as far as they wish: yet, foolish as it may be, I confess I am for standing on that punctilio. I think no governing State should ever by its own act, declare any of its dependencies independent: it is so contrary to the nature of a governing power, so humbling to the pride of a great nation, it must tend so entirely

tirely to annihilate the spirit of a people, and deprive them of that *indescribable something* that supports and cherishes them, that it is a step never to be taken, if it can be avoided. But is it avoidable now? Are not France, Spain, and America, too powerful for Great Britain? And would not Great Britain, in alliance with America, be a match for the other two? Is any one so credulous as to believe, that a declaration of American Independence would produce this alliance*? Is it not probable rather, that, exulting in having forced you to this last step of humiliation, they would tell you, You are still too late. The King of France, our great and good ally, is not to be forsaken by us. He who assisted us in our distress, and brought about the completion of our freedom, can we assist you with our arms against him? You who have attempted to tread upon our privi- privileges, and who have harrassed us by every act of civil and military oppression. We can never think your offer worthy of

* Read the answers of the Congress and the Commissioners. They do not say, Declare us independent, and we will unite with you against France; but, declare us independent, or withdraw your troops, and then we will treat with you; before that, we will have no correspondence with the Commissioners of Great Britain. Suppose them declared independent; suppose the Commissioners received, is there a probability they would enter into any alliance with you?

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our conſideration, becauſe that which you offer we already poſſeſs. We are independent; not becauſe Great Britain declares us ſo, but becauſe we can maintain our Independence in ſpite of all your exertions. You are therefore to expect no conceſſion from us for granting to us *de jure*, what we already poſſeſs *de facto* *.

It may be ſaid by thoſe who have more regard to the ſafety than to the dignity of

* The reſolution of Congreſs, Nov. 22, 1777, before any idea of a French treaty exiſted, may lead us to form a very probable conjecture of what their language will be——

In CONGRESS, *Nov.* 27.

Congreſs having received information, that the inſidious enemies of the United States of America have endeavoured to propagate falſe and groundleſs reports, that a treaty had been held between the Congreſs and the Commiſſioners of the King of Great Britain, by which it was probable that a reconciliation would take place:

Be it declared and reſolved, "That the Commiſſioners of the ſaid United States at the ſeveral Courts in Europe, be authorized to repreſent to the different Courts at which they reſpectively reſide, that no treaty whatever has been held between the King of Great Britain, or any of his Commiſſioners, and the ſaid Independent States, ſince the Declaration of Independence."

HENRY LAURENS, Preſident.

In CONGRESS, *Nov.* 22.

Reſolved, "That all propoſals for a treaty between the King of Great Britain, or any of his Commiſſioners, and the United States of America, inconſiſtent with the Independence of the ſaid States, or with ſuch treaties and alliances as ſhall be formed under their authority, will be rejected by Congreſs."

HENRY LAURENS, Preſident.

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the nation; by thoſe who love peace more than pre-eminence of character; why ſhould we not conclude peace with France, leaving America to become *independent*, and to form a State entirely *ſeparate* from Great Britain? We ſhall thereby reinſtate ourſelves in tranquility, and regain all the induſtry we have loſt by the interruption from the American war, and the loſs of the American trade. How far this would be the caſe, I cannot ſay; but if it were to be ſo, the expence at which it muſt be purchaſed is ſuch, as this nation can never ſupport. Shall Great Britain calmly abandon all thoſe claims over her Colonies, which ſhe lately held forth to the world; and after they have ſpurned her authority with every circumſtance of inſult and diſdain, ſubmit to the law which France has been pleaſed to dictate? This may be agreeable to the ſordid and pecuniary intereſt of Great Britain, but it never can be conſiſtent with the rank which ſhe has long held among the powers of Europe. If ſhe ſubmits to this, ſhe will ſuffer the finiſhing ſtroke of abaſement, and upon every frivolous occaſion ſhe may expect to be trampled upon by her neighbours, while every future exertion will be damped by her preſent diſgrace. I know that of late the queſtion of America has made one party treat national

dignity

dignity with ridicule, as insignificant and ideal; yet that party disavows that reasoning when the question is changed from America to France; and what may have been ill-founded pride with our Colonies, is just and solid dignity with our enemy. Taking it then for a maxim in politics, from which the nation is never to swerve, That the dignity of the nation is essential to its existence, I must conclude, that a Declaration of Independence to America, involving in it Peace with France as a condition, is never to be thought of.

Having thus far taken the point of honour into consideration, let us now consider the question of interest, and determine from thence what effect American *Independence* and *Separation* would produce upon this country. First, In point of population. Second, In point of territory and trade. Third, With respect to pre-eminence as a naval power.

1. It appears almost a necessary consequence, that if ever America shall possess equal political advantages with this country, it must drain this country of people. In America the price of labour is very high, and the price of land as well as of provisions very low; nor will there be any considerable taxes to diminish the advantages of the one, or increase the disadvantages

vantages of the other. A settlement there is easily and readily made, and every comfort of life easily and plentifully obtained. In this situation it is hardly to be doubted, that the labouring and manufacturing part of Great Britain will flock in crowds to America; inticed not only by the advantages already enumerated, but by the same language and religion, and by that civil and political freedom which this country enjoys, without any of the burthens under which it labours; nor would the evil, great as it may prove, rest here. Many of those whose estates were moveable would be induced to follow the example of the labourer and manufacturer. They would soon learn that their capital would be employed much more advantageously in the new than in the old world; that there money is a rare commodity, affording a high interest if lent out, a great profit if employed in cultivation of land, and an equally great, or greater, if employed in trade. The extensive coast, the number of sea-ports, and of navigable rivers capable of receiving ships of all burthens; the easy rate at which materials can be had for building them; the various commodities, the production of such various climates; all these circumstances must combine to induce those whose capital is moveable to go to America. Besides

 these

theſe pecuniary advantages, their ambition and vanity would prompt men to partake of the illuſtrious ſituation they might attain to in this new republic. In this country, the different ranks that have been long eſtabliſhed, and the inequality of fortune that uſually accompanies thoſe ranks, has made a high degree of political power and diſtinction attainable by very few. The ſmall number whom fortune, or accident, brings forth to public notice, or to extenſive influence, are generally themſelves either men of rank and fortune, or connected with men of rank and fortune. What would be reckoned only a competency in this country would in America be eſteemed affluence, and the poſſeſſor of it would be entitled to all the rank and conſideration that affluence beſtows. The natural tendency, therefore, of the Independence of America, and its total ſeparation from Britain, will be not only to deprive this country of the manufacturer whoſe labour produces capital, but of the capital which in its turn gives employment to the manufacturer; and though this may not take place by one ſudden ſtroke, it cannot fail to be ſenſibly felt in a courſe of years. In what number of years this will happen, the wiſeſt and beſt calculator will not take upon him to decide; but the ſhalloweſt politician may eaſily foreſee

foreſee that this country is to feel a diminution of men and capital in an increaſing ratio, though that ratio may not be the ſubject of accurate calculation: and in the end, this country may be left with little more ſtock than the cultivation of land, and the conſumption of thoſe who cultivate it can employ; certainly with no more people than the employment of that ſtock can maintain. When it ſhall arrive at this ſtate, or rather in the courſe of its advancing towards it, the evils which Britain may ſuffer can hardly be enumerated. The diminution of ſtock and the diminution of people, muſt neceſſarily be followed by a diminution of conſumption; the natural conſequences of which muſt be to lower the value of land; and when the value of land is thus lowered, it is impoſſible that it can maintain the ſame induſtry, or, in other words, employ the ſame ſtock it did originally; ſo that the effect of American *Independence* and *Seperation* is not only to deprive us of our uſeful inhabitants and moveable capital, but to lower the value of our land, and weaken the inducements to cultivate it. The conſequence of this, with regard to the proſperity of the nation, is too fatal and too evident to make me wiſh to dwell upon it. It muſt ſo weaken and depreſs us, both in point of men and

money, as to render us, if not an eaſy prey to any foreign power, at leaſt unable to maintain any pre-eminence or dignity. How *Engliſhmen* will reliſh the near proſpect of this, I leave *Engliſhmen* to determine.

2. In point of territory and trade. It appears likewiſe a neceſſary conſequence of American *Independence* and *Separation*, that we ſhould loſe our Weſt-India Colonies, and be deprived of Quebec and our Newfoundland fiſheries. The vicinity of America to thoſe poſſeſſions would ſurely operate, in ſome reſpect, towards bringing about that event. Beſides, with reſpect to the Weſt-Indies, America is, if not the only country that can afford lumber, the country that can afford it cheapeſt, and it will afford it cheaper and cheaper, in proportion as it ſhall encreaſe in numbers of people; becauſe the more land there is to clear, the more they muſt be able to afford. If the population of America goes on, and the induſtry of the people bears a proportion to it, they will be able to ſupply the Weſt-India market with many commodities; a ſhort carriage will render them cheap, and this connection will have its influence in producing an union between them and America. Beſides this circumſtance, it is ſo much in the power of America to harraſs the Weſt-India trade, that

that our iſlands will be happy to ſhare in a Government that renders them ſafe and independent, rather than to remain with this country unſafe and dependent; eſpecially if a reduction of the ſtrength of this country is to be the conſequence of American Independence, and a conſequent inability to aſſiſt them againſt America. What the effects of this alienation of our Weſt-India Colonies will be, I confeſs myſelf too ignorant of the particulars of that trade to be able to calculate. I own I am far from thinking it would be one of the greateſt evils attending the *Independence* and *Separation* of America; yet it would be ſuch a one as the preſent ſituation of this country is ill calculated to bear. It would withdraw or annihilate the capital of many merchants, who are now engaged in that trade, which, beſides diſtreſſing the individual merchants, would annihilate the proportion of induſtry, that capital kept in motion. The manufacturer, therefore, whoſe commodities ſupplied the Weſt-India market, muſt either be deprived of bread, or ſeek a new vent for his manufacture. And here let me obſerve again, that every thing conſpires to render a declaration of *Independence* and *Separation* in the higheſt degree favourable to America, and equally unfavourable to us. The loſs of the Weſt-Indies,

Indies, by depriving our manufacturers of bread, ſo far as they were employed in ſerving that market, muſt induce them to ſeek for employment elſewhere. While America, *independent* and *ſeparated*, holds out to him every gratification of free government, a ready merchant, and a high price for his labour.

With regard to our Newfoundland fiſheries, the arguments that apply to the Weſt-Indies apply likewiſe to it, viz. that our fiſheries are ſubject to conſtant depredations from the American navy, without the poſſibility of our giving conſtant aſſiſtance. The ſeas, for a conſiderable part of the year, prevent us from remaining in that quarter; and if we have no port in the neighbourhood to which we can go, a conſiderable time muſt be loſt before we can return to the ſtation; beſides, the inhabitants of New-England did formerly carry on the greateſt part of that trade, and their vicinity renders them again ready to ſeize upon the firſt opportunity to drive us from it. As this trade has always been eſteemed one of our principal nurſeries for ſeamen, its loſs muſt be very ſeverely felt by a nation, whoſe principal greatneſs depends upon her naval force. It is farther probable, from ſimilar reaſons, that Quebec would be loſt to this country. The inhabitants of that

that country are, by all accounts, far from being real friends to Great Britain. They have ſhewn themſelves ready, on all occaſions, to join the party that was like to prevail. If, therefore, America ſhould ſucceed, in forming herſelf into a ſeparate State, there is little doubt but Canada will declare in her favour. Whether Great Britain is able to overawe ſuch a declaration, it is hard to ſay; if ſhe were, ſhe would hold the dependence of Canada upon a very precarious tenure. If we loſe America, we may ſtill, perhaps, retain a channel, through which to circulate our manufactures to the reſt of the Continent, by retaining Quebec; and that fertile and extenſive province may remain for ſome time, a valuable dependence of this country. At the ſame time I greatly dread, that the moment it becomes really valuable, it will have ſtrength enough, with the aſſiſtance of its neighbours, to break the chains in which this country may hold it.

3. With regard to our pre-eminence, as a maritime power, it is not neceſſary here to prove, that Great Britain is the firſt maritime power of the world; or to remark, that to this pre-eminence, ſhe owes her former greatneſs. All the world acknowledges this truth, and every Briton feels it. It has ever been, and muſt always be the

policy

policy of this country to maintain a ſuperiority at ſea. Without this, ſhe never can be deemed a formidable nation; and if any other country ſhall ariſe, whoſe exertions in that way ſhall outdo thoſe of Great Britain, ſhe may, from that moment, date her fate. If America acquires Independence, and eſtabliſhes herſelf a ſeparate and powerful nation, there can be little doubt ſhe will in time outdo Great Britain in all her exertions by ſea. In every article but one, ſhe has the advantage of this country. The ſingle one I allude to, is the price of labour. But when we conſider that America poſſeſſes, within herſelf, all the materials for ſhip building, it will not be difficult to conceive, that theſe advantages will infinitely overbalance the ſingle diſadvantage under which ſhe labours *.

The ſea-coaſt of America, from Florida to Canada, is filled with bays, rivers, and creeks, calculated to admit of the fineſt harbours in the known world, and ſhe already poſſeſſes many ports fit for the conſtruction of the firſt rate men of war. Timber abounds there to a much greater degree

* It is to be obſerved too, that emigrations from this country will gradually reduce the price of labour, by bringing more labour into the market; for labour, like any other commodity, is higher or lower according to plenty or ſcarcity.

than

than in any other part of the globe, and pitch and tar can be produced in the utmoſt abundance. Hemp is the natural growth of the ſoil, and iron ſtone is to be found in great quantities in many parts of that Continent. When unreſtrained by the laws of this country, the inhabitants will find but little difficulty in erecting founderies for the making of cannon, and forges for making anchors. Convenient ſituations for water are not wanting, and charcoal may be had at a very eaſy rate *. With all theſe advantages, who can doubt that, in proceſs of time, America, if ſeparated from us, muſt outdo this country in every maritime exertion, and be ready, on every occaſion, to outſtrip the ſplendour of the Britiſh navy, once ſo formidable to every hoſtile power.

What then is to be done? How is Great Britain, in her preſent ſituation, to extricate herſelf from the difficulties that ſurround her? There ſeem to be here but two methods remaining, 1. Either to attempt ſo to depreſs America, as to render it impracticable for her to raiſe her head againſt this country. Or, 2. To give up all hoſtility againſt America for the preſent, and bend our whole force againſt France.

* Such eſtabliſhments would redound to the advantage of America doubly, for nothing clears the land ſo much as iron works of both kinds, by the conſumption of wood.

As to the firſt, there is in it a degree of cruelty, to which the moſt reſolute minds can hardly bring themſelves, and nothing but the laſt neceſſity ſhould make us adopt. The ſecond, therefore, ſeems to be the only means we have leſt; how far it will be a proper ſtep, we may conjecture with a conſiderable degree of probability. But before I proceed to this conjecture, I ſhall very ſhortly lay down the mode in which I ſhould think it ought to be done.

We ought to remove our troops from every part of America, with the exception of Halifax, Quebec, and St. Auguſtine. The firſt to protect our fiſheries, and as an excellent port to rendevouz in, and for refitting our ſhips; Quebec for the purpoſes abovementioned, as an inlet for our manufactures to America; and St. Auguſtine as a near and convenient port for our operations in the Weſt-Indies. Upon withdrawing the troops, I would at the ſame time withdraw the Commiſſioners *; and I would publicly declare a ſuſpenſion of all hoſtilities with Britiſh America, both by ſea and land, and that they may trade, without moleſtation, to what part of the globe they pleaſe, unleſs they ſhall attempt to make

* Since theſe ſheets went to the preſs, it is underſtood that the Commiſſioners are upon their return.

captures

captures upon our trade, in which caſe we ſhould retaliate.

After having publiſhed a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, and annulled the Commiſſion, a queſtion occurs, Whether we ſhould repeal the ſeveral Acts of Parliament, that have gone by the name of the Conciliatory Bills*. Here, with all the original diſpoſition that any body could poſſeſs to tax America, I am clearly of opinion, that thoſe Acts ſhould not again be repealed. Firſt, becauſe there is ſomething weak and contemptible in a legiſlative body, changing its opinion with every breath of wind. And ſecondly, becauſe, whatever this country may have been able to do formerly, I think it now impracticable to enforce our claims over America. Relinquiſhing America, therefore, at preſent, we ought to apply the whole ſtrength and reſources of this country againſt France.

At the ſame time that we retain at home a force, equal to what we maintained laſt ſummer, to prevent every whiſper of invaſion, we ſhould, with the army we have in America, garriſon our own Weſt-India iſlands, and make deſcents upon the French: all the reſt of our exertions ought to be made by ſea. Expreſs orders ought to be given to all Commanders to engage the French,

* The Bill empowering his Majeſty to appoint Commiſſioners expires on the 1ſt of June, 1779.

 wherever

wherever there is a probability of ſucceſs, together with an abſolute authority to take every merchant ſhip belonging to them. If the public exertions upon the ſeas equal, or nearly equal, thoſe that have been made by individuals, I can have little doubt, that the French will ſoon become tired of a war where they muſt ſuffer almoſt on every occaſion. For in ſpite of the action, in the Bay of Biſcay, of laſt ſummer, I muſt ſtill conſider this country as infinitely ſuperior to the French at ſea: and though neither our Miniſters, nor the Commanders appointed by our Miniſters, have much to boaſt of, yet, the great exertions of individuals have clearly demonſtrated what this nation is capable of doing, if it had men at its head poſſeſſed either of ſpirit or capacity to conduct it. I take it for granted then, that if a naval war is conducted with vigour on the part of this country againſt France, there is little doubt of our being victorious, and of our reducing that country in a very ſhort time to the neceſſity of ſuing for peace. When that time ſhall come, it is not to be doubted, that the firſt condition ought to be a renunciation of the American treaty, and an expreſs declaration upon the part of France, properly guarantied to Great Britain, that ſhe is never again to interfere on the part of America. Till this ſhall be procured, nothing ought to be

be done to America, but the queſtion left implicitly at reſt. When it ſhall be procured, I have not a doubt that the matter will be brought into as deſireable a ſituation as we can now expect. America will offer to agree with Great Britain upon terms ſuch as Great Britain may accept; for it cannot admit of a doubt, that Great Britain can, with dignity and propriety, accept of much leſs when offered by America than ſhe can with dignity and propriety offer in the firſt inſtance to America. Having laid down what I would recommend as the mode of proceeding, I think I can venture to conjecture with ſome degree of probability, that terms will be offered by America.

When the troops of Great Britain ſhall be withdrawn, when the object that occupied them ſhall ceaſe to exiſt, it is more than probable that differences will take place between different Colonies, and may even find their way into the Congreſs itſelf. In this ſituation it is hardly to be doubted, that finding their great and good ally, the French King, unable to aſſiſt them any longer, attributing (with that change of ſentiment, which a change of fortune generally begets, eſpecially in the midſt of popular tumult) all their evils to his intervention and to his intrigue, they will chace away his Ambaſſador with indignation,

equal

equal to the cordiality with which they received him, and will be happy to take refuge once more in the arms of Britain. Upon this ſuppoſition, it may be proper to conſider upon what terms Great Britain ought to cloſe with America.

Great Britain has, by the Conciliatory Bills, given up the original ſubject of conteſt between her and America, and thoſe, I ſuppoſe, ſhe does not mean to repeal. The only queſtion that remains is with reſpect to a nominal dependence. If America then ſhould offer to come into ſuch terms as would avoid a total ſeparation, and ſecure a conſtant and reciprocal ſupport between the two countries, ſo that the ſtrength of the one country, ſhould be the ſtrength of the other, and their intereſts ſo cloſely united, that nothing could ſeparate them, I would give up the nominal dependency to procure ſuch an union. Taxation nobody now thinks of; and the article of altering their Government is equally given up. Why then ſhould we heſitate at their retaining the form of Government they themſelves have eſtabliſhed, providing they agree to the union of intereſts above hinted at? What I would propoſe to unite their intereſts, I ſhall proceed to ſtate. That the natives of America ſhould be natives of Great Britain, and upon coming to this country,

country, ſhould enjoy all the privileges of Britiſh ſubjects as they did formerly. That in the ſame manner, the natives of Great Britain ſhould, upon going to America, be entitled to all the privileges of American ſubjects. That the ports of the one nation ſhould be reciprocally open to the other. That the prerogative of declaring peace and war ſhould remain in the King of Great Britain; every other ſovereign power within America being allowed to remain in Congreſs, upon the footing in which it now ſtands, viz. the internal defence of America, by which the army and navy remains in their power; the appointment of every civil and military officer; and, in ſhort, the whole power of ſupporting and regulating their Government, with the ſingle exception above-mentioned. By this means the dreadful addition of influence which the Crown would have got with the patronage of America will be totally avoided. If this regulation ſhould take place, I ſhould think a Council, or Agents, ought to be appointed by the King to reſide in America, to take care of the intereſts of this country in America; and in the ſame manner, a Council, or Agents, ſhould be appointed by the Congreſs to reſide in Great Britain, to take care of the intereſts of America here, with competent ſalaries, appointed by their reſpective countries. By this

this means the ſtrength of Great Britain would become the ſtrength of America, and the ſtrength of America would be the ſtrength of Great Britain. That dread and terror which conſtantly hangs over my mind, that America is to ruin us by drawing away our people, getting poſſeſſion of the Weſt-Indies, Newfoundland, and Quebec, and becoming more powerful than us at ſea, would be in a great meaſure, if not entirely, removed. But even if matters were brought to that point, where ſuch regulations could be made, there muſt ſtill remain great difficulty in the arrangement of particulars.

Nothing is attended with greater nicety than new regulations of Government, and no meaſure ought to be taken with greater diffidence. Even where ſimilar circumſtances give authority for ſimilar inſtitutions, there are ſo many ſmall variations imperceptible to human penetration, that the effect of them can hardly be foretold. When the ſituation is entirely new, and neither the knowledge of paſt events, nor a variety of actual experience, can furniſh out inſtances of the ſame nature, it muſt encreaſe the difficulty to ſuch a degree, as to render the boldeſt politician timorous. This laſt is ſo much the ſituation of the preſent ſubject, that it is with the utmoſt diffidence

diffidence I ſubmit my thoughts to the public. As probable conjecture of what may be the effect of theſe regulations is all we can arrive it, I am ſenſible that it will be very eaſy to offer ſuch objections to this ſcheme of Union as may prevent its ever receiving a ſerious conſideration. Many of theſe objections readily occur to myſelf; partial I may be ſuppoſed to be to my own plans, yet to moſt of them, I think, I can give a ſatisfactory anſwer.

1. It has been ſaid, that America, France, and Spain, will prove too ſtrong for Great Britain; that Great Britain was victorious in the laſt war; but to what did ſhe owe her victories? To the aſſiſtance and ſupport ſhe received from her Colonies. Without diſputing the laſt part of the propoſition, which I think too might be diſputed, I ſhall conſider the firſt part of it. If by this is meant, that Great Britain will not be able to cope with America, France, and Spain, while ſhe continues to make an expenſive war upon the continent of America, that I can eaſily allow, becauſe the expence of that war alone, from its diſtance, and from its being in an enemy's country, is immenſe; and that expence muſt now be greatly encreaſed by the additional riſques to which we are expoſed from the depredations of the French: but if we do not

 continue

continue hoſtilities in the American Colonies, there is no reaſon to apprehend that France, Spain and America, will be an over-match for Great Britain. The ſame annual expence, which was laid out in the American quarrel, will be ſufficient to carry on the naval war propoſed, and enable us to out-number our adverſaries in ſhips of of the line; and I am apt to think that the depredations of our King's ſhips and privateers, if they do not ſupply us with funds, will certainly ſupply us with ſpirit to purſue it. We know very well from former trials what France and Spain can effect; and the aſſiſtance of America in ſuch a war, conſidering her preſent circumſtances, will be of little importance: they have no ſhips of great ſize, and are not yet in a condition to fit them out; beſides, when they learn our intention of giving no diſturbance to their trade, it is probable that, in their preſent exhauſted condition, they will yield but a feeble aſſiſtance to their allies.

2. It may be ſuppoſed that the Americans will not yield up that material point of ſovereignty to the King of Great Britain, the power of making peace and war; and that they will not chooſe to be involved in every quarrel in which our Sovereign may chooſe to be engaged. It is likely, however, that after ſo long a courſe of warfare, America

America will be inclined to relinquiſh this point, eſpecially if they find that France is no longer able to protect them; beſides, they can hardly ſuſpect that Great Britain, ſo burthened with taxes, will be diſpoſed wantonly to diſtreſs America, by engaging in groundleſs quarrels, which muſt prove oppreſſive to herſelf. It is likewiſe to be obſerved, that the Americans are left with the ſole power of finding ſupplies upon ſuch occaſions, and may withhold them whenever they ſee cauſe for it.

But it will be ſaid, where then is the advantage to Great Britain, if America withholds the ſupplies for the war? Great Britain, without any advantage received, will bear the whole burthen. Here I ſhould think the intereſt of America would lead her to be as liberal as ſhe can; her trade and territory are always liable to be attacked by the enemies of Great Britain; ſo that if ſhe is thus united with Great Britain, ſelf-defence muſt lead her to defend both; in this way ſhe is forced to give us a naval aſſiſtance; and by defending her own territory, ſhe ſaves us from what ſhe formerly coſt us defending her with our troops. Great Britain, I truſt, will always be able to defend herſelf, as well as the territories ſhe may poſſeſs abroad; and may into the bargain be able to make deſcents upon the dependencies of her neighbours, either for the ſake of terror

or diverſion. As to a Continental war, I never wiſh to ſee us engaged in it; and, therefore, never can think it expedient to provide for it. Beſides, if America has a mutual intereſt with this country in the Weſt-India iſlands and our fiſheries, and provides her proportion for the defence of them, the intereſts of the two countries will ſtill be more cloſely united, and neither England nor America will dare to allow each other to be moleſted by foreign powers, without running the riſque of ruining their intereſt in thoſe valuable poſſeſſions. But it may be ſaid by America, that if ſhe ſhall be injured in her property by foreign nations, the King of Great Britain, by not declaring war, may avoid avenging her injuries for the ſake of ſparing Great Britain. To this I would anſwer firſt of all; the American Council will always have it in their power to repreſent the affairs of America, and it would be an odious meaſure for Britain to refuſe their aſſiſtance upon a proper repreſentation. In the next place, it is the intereſt of Great Britain to aſſiſt America in every ſuch caſe, for the ſame reaſon that it is the intereſt of America to aſſiſt Great Britain. The enemies of both will, by depredations upon the nation that ſhall incline to be neuter, force them to defend themſelves.

The Americans might farther ſay, Why may we not have a ſhare, at leaſt, in the power

power of making peace and war? Might not our Congreſs have a communication of that Sovereignty? But how is it poſſible, at the diſtance at which we are ſituated, to fall upon any method, by which to communicate this power, and how could a Council ever be appointed to manage that matter, without ſuch jarring and abſurdity as would render their interference inadequate and ridiculous. It muſt alſo occur, that a numerous body, like the Congreſs, can never be ſo fit for this part of execution as a ſingle perſon.

3. The third objection is, That giving the natives of this country the privileges of Americans, upon going to that country, will operate like a bounty upon emigration from this country, and induce the inhabitants of Great Britain to ſettle in America more rapidly than if that country was diſunited and hoſtile. This, I make no doubt, would, in part, be the effect of this union, and for this very reaſon, I think it might operate as an inducement to America to enter into it with cordiality. Nor can an encreaſe of emigration, in this event, be ſo great an evil, as an inferior emigration, in caſe of the two countries being totally ſeparated, ſince the people who leave Britain to ſettle in America, may ſtill be conſidered as a part of our ſtrength.

4. There yet remains to this mode of ſettlement, an objection which will, perhaps,

haps, meet with more ſupporters than any that has been yet ſtated. I mean that it is propoſed, by this ſettlement, to give up the excluſive trade, which this nation has enjoyed with America. To this trade has been generally attributed the late ſplendor and encreaſing wealth of this country. Stateſmen, merchants, and political writers, however much they may have differed in other points, have, till very lately, been unanimouſly agreed about this.

In anſwer to this Objection, I would aſk, Is there any perſon, who is now ſo ſanguine as to flatter himſelf, that this country can now retain the excluſive right to that trade? No perſon, I imagine, believes, that in the preſent poſture of affairs, this is practicable.

But I will venture to go a ſtep farther, and to aſſert, that the loſs of this excluſive trade will not be ſo detrimental to Great Britain, as has been generally apprehended. This point, is, in my opinion, clearly eſtabliſhed by two late authors * on that ſubject, whoſe

* Dean Tucker was the firſt that publiſhed upon this ſubject. But the argument is more fully handled by Dr. Smith, in his inquiry into the nature and cauſes of the wealth of nations. A work which contains more original genius, ſound reaſoning, and profound knowledge, and what is more valuable than any of them, more independence of thought than almoſt any work the world is poſſeſſed of. The author has been equally bold and ſucceſsful in combating vulgar and received

whoſe writings have excited the public attention. As the reaſoning of thoſe eminent writers is well known, it would be a treſpaſs upon the reader's time, if I was to ſtate their arguments at full length. I ſhall only ſtate in few words, the reſult of what they appeared to me to have completely proved.

1. There ſeems great reaſon to doubt, whether the trade of America was ever ſo beneficial to Great Britain as has been commonly imagined. That the advancement of Britain, as a commercial country, has kept pace with her progreſs in the ſettling the American Colonies, cannot I think be denied. But it ſeems alſo evident, that when thoſe Colonies became conſiderable, our merchants were induced, by the proſpect of monopoly to quit the trade of Europe, in which they had been formerly engaged, and to turn their capitals into that of America; and though this latter trade was evidently more profitable to the merchant, there is good ground to ſuſpect that it was not ſo to the nation; becauſe, as it yielded a more diſtant return of commodi-

ceived opinions, upon many points; and in ſpite of all that has been written upon political œconomy, he has greatly improved and added to that important ſcience. If the reader, who is unacquainted with this work, ſhall find me dark and unintelligible, he has only to conſult it, B. 4. C. vii. part 3. to receive perfect ſatisfaction and great inſtruction.

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ties, it could not ſupport ſo great a degree induſtry at home. No propoſition appears better founded than this, that a near trade, which affords quick returns, is, if other circumſtances are equal, calculated to produce the greateſt quantity of manufactures, and, therefore, to give the greateſt employment to induſtry. No trade, however, ever yielded ſlower returns than that of America.

2. Admitting the trade of America to have been ever ſo beneficial to Great Britain, it ſeems evident that by far the greateſt and moſt beneficial part of this trade would remain, though the reſtrictive laws with reſpect to it were totally removed. The beſt part of the trade between Britain and America, conſiſts in the exchange of thoſe articles which are produced by the two countries cheaper and better than in other part of the world. In the greater part of manufactures with which Britain ſupplies America, there is no danger that, for a long time at leaſt, ſhe can be rivalled by other nations, as might eaſily be ſhewn by an enumeration of all our moſt common branches of manufacture. All this trade, therefore, is totally independent of our monoply with America, and it would be carried on even to a greater extent, if that monopoly were aboliſhed, becauſe the fear of competition would be apt to produce

duce a greater exertion of induſtry in our mercantile people.

3. With reſpect to thoſe articles, with which we ſupply the American market, and with which, by our own labour, we cannot furniſh ſo cheap as our neighbours, it merits attention. Firſt, That as our intereſt requires we ſhould purchaſe thoſe manufactures from other neighbouring nations, the mercantile profit which we draw upon the ſale of them to America, ariſes merely from the carriage of thoſe goods, and is therefore, comparatively, of little importance. Secondly, That as not only America, but all the world beſides, has an intereſt to ſmuggle thoſe commodities, we muſt of neceſſity, from the diſtance and extent of the American coaſt, incur a very exorbitant charge in preventing frauds of that nature; and after all, it is obvious, that the efforts we make for this purpoſe can have little effect. So that in ſpite of all we can do, the ſmuggled trade, in theſe articles, will always be very conſiderable.

From theſe conſiderations, it ſhould ſeem no difficult matter to perſuade us, in our preſent circumſtances, to make a *virtue* of *neceſſity*, and to yield up, without murmuring, thoſe reſtrictive regulations, which are far from having that beneficial tendency

commonly ſuppoſed, and which appear, upon a ſtrict examination, to have proceeded from narrow prejudices, and partial motives of intereſt, rather than from any extenſive and liberal views of policy.

If the objections which occur to the mode of union propoſed, are in any degree obviated, let us conſider next what material advantages this union will produce to both countries; for unleſs the advantages are mutual, we need not hope to find advocates on either ſide of the Atlantic.

With reſpect to America, except in one inſtance, it ſeems to give them every thing for which they have fought lately, and much more than they demanded at the commencement of hoſtilities. They will have an unmoleſted communication of trade with all the world, beſides the Weſt-Indies being thrown open to them. They will have Britiſh protection againſt foreign inſult, whenever that ſhall happen. The Government then will be more ſecure, and as free as if they had no connection with Great Britain, becauſe the whole civil and military ſovereignty is in the power of the Congreſs and ſubordinate aſſemblies in America: and every object of ambition, of intereſt, and of fame, will remain entire to thoſe who ſhall wiſh to purſue them.

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With regard to this country, I cannot help thinking that this mode of union will alſo have its advantages. Nothing can be ſo impolitic as to extend the territory of a country, without extending the means of ſupporting and defending it. The policy, therefore, which laid the whole of the ſupport and defence of America on Great Britain, ought not, ſince America has become a great and populous country, to be any longer retained. The expence of the civil Government of any country is very inſignificant in compariſon of its military Government: the expence of the firſt America herſelf was very capable of defraying *: the expence of the ſecond fell entirely, with very trifling exceptions, upon Great Britain. Without reckoning the expence of the laſt war, or entering into the queſtion of, whether that war ought to be ſtated to the account of America, the peace eſtabliſhment for the Colonies was very conſiderable; beſides guards and garriſons, the number of veſſels neceſſary to prevent ſmuggling was immenſe. By the ſyſtem propoſed here, all thoſe inconveniences will be remov-

* It is unneceſſary here to enter into the trifling exceptions of Governors ſalaries, and the different regulations of different provinces reſpecting their civil Government. They are of no uſe in this diſcuſſion, and every body knows that America is ſufficiently apprized of them.

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ed; America will defray the expence of every eſtabliſhment, civil and military; and Great Britain, beſides the trade ſhe may have with America, in common with the reſt of the world, and perhaps in preference to it, becauſe ſhe has been thrown, by the American monoply, into manufactures adapted to the American market, will have all the ſtrength of America to aſſiſt her upon every emergency.

But, however beneficial this agreement may be to the two countries, there is ſtill one obſtacle remaining. The Miniſters of this country, even in the abject conceſſions they have made, have never aimed at quitting with the patronage of America. Always deſirous of maintaining what enables them to oblige their dependents, and ſecures them in the poſſeſſion of their offices, they will be unwilling to adopt a ſyſtem which deprives them of ſo extenſive a power to oblige, and may diminiſh their political influence. Without entering into the real advantages to the country, attending the depriving the Miniſters of the Crown of this additional means of Corruption, advantages glaringly manifeſt to all who value the liberty of their country, it does not ſeem to me poſſible that the moſt ſanguine, or the moſt ignorant Miniſter, can now entertain the hope

hope of reaping any advantage from the diſpoſal of places in America.

Whether the neceſſary ſtep to carry that plan into execution (the beating the French at ſea, the ruining their trade, and moleſting their poſſeſſions in the Weſt-Indies) is practicable, or what means will make it practicable, is the only queſtion that now remains. When I contemplate the ſpirit of the nation, and reflect on the actions of individuals, for theſe laſt five months, I cannot entertain a doubt of our ſucceſs in theſe particulars. When I look back upon the conduct of our Miniſters, for the laſt five years, every thing appears ſo dark and uncertain, that it is difficult to ſay to what ſide we ſhould turn for relief.

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